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Abstract
This paper studies regulatory policy interventions aimed at protecting vulnerable consumers
who are disengaged and thus exposed to exploitation. We model heterogeneous consumer
switching costs alongside asymmetric market shares. This setting encompasses many markets
in which established firms are challenged by new entrants. We identify circumstances under
which such interventions can be counterproductive, both with regard to the stated consumer
protection objective and the complementary aim to promote competition.
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1 Introduction
The presence of sticky, or “unengaged”, consumers who find it costly to switch from their
current service provider is arguably one of the most intractable issues faced by competition
and consumer protection authorities [Authority for Consumers and Markets, 2014, Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, 2017, European Commission, 2016,
Financial Conduct Authority, 2015, Hortac¸su et al., 2017, OECD, 2017]. From a competition
policy perspective, such loyal customers, often labelled a provider’s “back-book”, are said
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to convey unfair competitive advantages to large oligopolistic incumbents because they are
typically more profitable than “front-book” customers who are more active, regularly shop
around in search for a better deal and find it less costly to switch [Productivity Commission,
2018].
The kind of markets that form the backdrop to our analysis involve utilities such as
retail energy, basic telecom services and retail financial services such as current accounts.
They provide essential services that every consumer must purchase to satisfy basic needs.
Hence, consumers typically show very little preference for variety, so that competing offers
are perceived as closely substitutable as long as a minimum level of service quality and
reliability is guaranteed; i.e. the main trigger for shopping around is having suffered a
severe service disruption. Therefore, given that these markets typically exhibit full market
coverage, the potential lock-in of consumers who find it costly to switch and their exploitation
are significant policy concerns.
These markets are nevertheless dynamic and have recently experienced entry by “chal-
lenger” firms. Yet “challenger” firms typically face barriers to entry and expansion due to
higher customer acquisition costs, i.e. to overcome consumer inertia, and they risk that
the make-up of their customer base ends up being overexposed towards customers with low
switching costs and hence high propensity to switch [Authority for Consumers and Markets,
2014, Financial Conduct Authority, 2015]. This typically gives rise to asymmetric market
shares, at least initially.
In this paper, we study an array regulatory policy interventions aimed at protecting
consumers whose switching costs make them disengaged and vulnerable to exploitation. In a
duopoly setting, we model heterogeneous switching costs of consumers alongside asymmetric
market shares. We thereby investigate how the distribution of switching costs and market
shares interact under various pricing regimes that arise from regulatory intervention. We
evaluate the regimes in terms of welfare of vulnerable consumers and discuss their implica-
tions for competition.
Pricing regimes indeed may impact on market structure. Compounding the issue of
consumer inertia creating entry and expansion barriers, incumbents can recur to the use of
behavioural-based price discrimination (BBPD) in order to stifle the growth of “challenger”
firms or deter entry altogether. One obvious form of BBPD is history-base price discrimi-
nation (HBPD), whereby firms offer separate poaching prices to rivals’ customers, typically
at a discount off the price paid by existing customers, and possibly to the detriment of the
retained customers [Financial Conduct Authority, 2017]. 1 The combined effect of the initial
1For example, [Competition and Markets Authority, 2016a], para 8.232ff, finds evidence of price
discrimination between new start-ups and established businesses with respect to business current accounts.
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asymmetry of market shares and the potential exploitation of a large portion of locked-in
consumers suggests potentially very large consumer detriment [Competition and Markets
Authority, 2016a,b, Hortac¸su et al., 2017]. Furthermore, the study of history-based price
discrimination with asymmetric market shares is policy relevant because, at least in Europe,
the abuse of market dominance is only an issue, in light of Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, if the firm in question holds a dominant position.
From a consumer protection policy perspective, the traditional view is that consumer
disengagement is best addressed by improving transparency, to spur disengaged consumer
to start shopping around by helping them appreciate that there are material gains from
switching. For example, authorities can impose disclosure remedies such as requiring firms
to send reminders to their customers when a promotional period is about to expire, perhaps
detailing how much they could gain by switching to another promotional deal that is typically
targeted at new customers [Financial Conduct Authority, 2015].2 This type of disclosure
remedy effectively rules out the use of HBPD [Financial Conduct Authority, 2016, OECD,
2016].3 Nevertheless, firms can still rely on BBPD, to the extent that existing customers
with relatively high switching costs might still struggle to take corrective action in response
to prompts and alerts received by the current firm or shopping advice obtained from third-
party intermediaries.4 We label this configuration HBPD with “leakage”, in the sense that
this type of intervention effectively imposes a profit sacrifice, due to the risk of revenue
cannibalisation as a result of “internal” switching, when poaching rivals’ customers.
Support for the traditional reliance on disclosure remedies is waning, however. This
is on the basis of evidence that the use of prompts and alerts is ineffective towards a
core of “back-book” customers with high switching costs [Adams et al., 2018, Financial
Conduct Authority, 2018a]5. The persistent exploitation of “back-book” customers is seen
2See [Competition and Markets Authority, 2016a] for a more sophisticated version of this type of remedy,
labelled Open Banking, whereby the largest incumbent banks are required to adopt a standardised application
programme interface (API) through which smaller banks and third party intermediaries such as price
comparison websites will be allowed to access, with the customers consent, data on individual consumption
profiles and applied tariffs in order to be able to show consumers tailored price comparisons.
3See, for example, the literature published by Nationwide, the largest UK building society, with
respect to its range of savings products which includes a commitment to offer “brand new customer
only” savings accounts, available at https://www.nationwide.co.uk/support/support-articles/terms-and-
conditions/savings-accounts. Effectively, this type of disclosure remedy compels firms to try to retain
customers by making available to them the same deals offered to new customers.
4In this sense, it could be argued that this configuration effectively resembles the use of most-favoured-
customer clauses (MFCCs) when consumers face heterogeneous “hassle” cost to enforce their right by asking
their current service provider to match the lower price offered to other (potentially new) customers.
5For example, during the second half of 2015 the FCA tested the use of a return switching form where
customers were sent a letter with an indication of potential gains from switching to the best internal rate
(ie, offered by the same provider) and the best competitor rate based on a non-personalised balance example
(£5,000), plus a tear-off return switching form pre-filled for a switch to the best internal rate, along with a
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as particularly problematic to the extent that those consumers with high switching costs
are typically considered to be vulnerable due to certain demographic attributes such as low
income, low scholarly achievements and old age [Competition and Markets Authority, 2016b,
Financial Conduct Authority, 2018b]. Accordingly, there are calls for stronger remedial
interventions aimed at directly restricting firms’ ability to exploit “back-book” customers on
fairness grounds.6
A straightforward option would be to ban price discrimination altogether, so that firms
are only allowed to set one price for both, “back-book” and “front-book” customers, be they
existing and prospective ones.7 Such a draconian intervention, though, is normally considered
to be a sort of backstop remedy of last resort[Financial Conduct Authority, 2018a,b]. This
remedy would effectively implement a uniform pricing (UP) regime.
An alternative, subtler option would be to permit HBPD but requiring that the “lock-
in” price charged to “back-book” customers is pegged to the “poaching” price offered to
new customers, e.g. by setting a maximum multiple for the ratio of the former price to
the latter one [Financial Conduct Authority, 2018a,b]. Under this pricing regime, “front-
book” customers would effectively be relied upon to protect ‘back-book” ones from unfair
exploitation due to excessive prices.8 We label this pricing regime HBPD with a peg.
In general, though, regulatory intervention aimed at protecting “back-book” customers
is fraught with concerns about equity and about its impact on the intensity of competition.9
Therefore, it is very important to understand under what circumstances policy interventions
aimed at protecting unengaged customers from exploitation would actually work. We charac-
terise the conditions under which “locked-in” prices charged to “back-book” customers under
prepaid envelope. In the nine weeks following the receipt of the letter, internal switching increased from a
baseline of less than 0.5% to slightly above 8.5%, whereas external switching hardly changed. See Adams
et al. [2016]
6See Competition and Markets Authority [2016b], Financial Conduct Authority [2018a,b], UK Depart-
ment for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) [2018]. The BEIS Consumer Green paper states
(para. 41): “We believe there should be a new approach by government and regulators to safeguard consumers
who, for whatever reason, remain loyal to their existing supplier so that they are not materially disadvantaged.
Exploitation of these customers by charging them significantly higher prices and providing poorer service is a
sign of a market that is not working well and should be tackled vigorously.” See also UK Government,“Victory
for consumers as cap on energy tariffs to become law - New bill will protect millions more households from
unfair price rises”, Press release, 19 July 2018, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news.
7A similar outcome would result from a requirement that firms automatically upgrade consumers to their
cheapest available tariff.
8In this sense, this configuration is reminiscent of the relationship between tourist’ and locals’ in the classic
model of price dispersion of Varian [1980], with the difference that in that seminal paper firms randomise
over a range of (uniform) prices as they face a trade-off between exploiting the former and competing for
the latter: see Armstrong [2015] for a discussion.
9For example, OECD [2016], para. 136, report that the UK energy regulator imposed a non-discrimination
requirement on energy firms. However, after receiving criticism the CMA identified this as softening
competition and has therefore recommended its removal.
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HBPD are lower than those they would face under uniform pricing, HBPD with “leakage”
and HBPD with a “peg”.
Besides the distributional impact to the detriment of “front-book” consumers, consumer
protection policy interventions that are ultimately aimed at unwinding the use of HBPD
are also contentious from a competition policy perspective. On the one hand, it is well-
established that the use of price discrimination under oligopoly can intensify pricing rivalry
where competing firms exhibit best-response asymmetry, in that they hold opposing view as
to which consumers are “strong” and which are instead “weak” [Armstrong, 2006b]. On the
other hand, the use of HBPD by the dominant incumbent may be part of an exclusionary
anticompetitive strategy aimed at foreclosing a potential entrant whilst mitigating the en-
tailed profit sacrifice [Fumagalli and Motta, 2013, Gehrig et al., 2012, Karlinger and Motta,
2012]. We investigate this potential trade-off by comparing firms profits and market shares
under the various pricing regimes investigated.
Ultimately, our aim is to investigate under what circumstances there may also be a trade-
off between the consumer protection policy objective to protect “back-book” consumers
and the competition policy objective to sponsor “challenger” rival firms. With respect to
the latter, we also model asymmetric treatments where only one firm, typically the larger
incumbent, is subjected to the regulatory requirement.
This paper studies pricing models – unrestricted HBPD, HBPD subject to disclosure
(internal “leakage”) and pegging restrictions, and UP - with random heterogeneous switching
costs that differ across duopolistic firms with asymmetric market shares. In doing so, the
paper generalizes and extends the analysis of “mature markets” with common uniformly
distributed switching costs in Chen [1997]. Our framework is related to Gehrig et al.
[2012] who study the welfare implications of HBPD under asymmetric market shares. The
authors find that even when firms can price discriminate between new and current customers,
poaching might not take place if switching costs are sufficiently high. Moreover, where market
shares are particularly skewed, the erosion of the larger firm’s customer base is larger than
under uniform pricing. Indeed, for very asymmetric inherited market shares the larger firm
may not offer a poaching offer given that it would be too costly to attract marginal customers
that are close to the previous cut-off point, but very far from the opposite extreme where the
dominant firm is located. This is because, similar to Thisse and Vives [1988], the authors
also include brand preferences under a linear Hotelling model so that it is too expensive for
the larger firm to pre-empt poaching of its least loyal customers.
We believe that the inclusion of heterogeneous brand preferences to model competition
in “switching markets” is problematic, however. In the Hotelling linear duopoly model of
product differentiation and horizontal brand preferences, loyal customers are the ones paying
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the lowest ’delivered’ price, inclusive of the ’transport’ cost due to distance in product space;
marginal consumers that firms compete over are located farther away from either firm and
end-up paying a higher ’delivered’ price. In contrast to this, the main competition concern
raised in the context of consumer disengagement is that loyal “back-book” customers - those
less likely to switch - arguably are the ones being exploited by their current provider and
pay higher prices, compared to marginal, “front-book” customers. Indeed, a corollary of
customer inertia due to the lack of engagement is, at least anecdotally, that customers fail
to see that there are benefits from switching because they are under the impression that
competing firms are undifferentiated.
We acknowledge that models with heterogeneously distributed switching costs tend to be
isomorphic to Hotelling models with asymmetric transport costs, even when market shares
are also asymmetric. We decided to cast our analysis in terms of switching costs, rather than
brand preferences, because in the typical switching markets that were subject to CMA and
FCA scrutiny and that contextualize our study brand preference does not appear to play a
significant role.10
Another feature of the Hotelling model of horizontal differentiation that does not fit the
stylised facts is that a firm with the smaller market share is protected from the risk of further
customer “poaching” thanks to the fact that the make-up of its customer base is dominated
by very loyal customers who face very high “transport” costs. This is in contrast to the view
that “challenger” firms, which start by definition with very small market shares, might be
over-exposed to incumbents’ “front-book” customers with low switching costs.
Accordingly, our approach is to directly model heterogeneous switching costs, rather than
brand preferences. Moreover, in addition to Gehrig et al. [2012] we also analyse unilateral
incentives to adopt BBPD. Our framework is closest to Shaffer and Zhang [2000] who allow for
heterogenous switching costs, distributed according to a uniform distribution with common
minima equal to zero, and asymmetric baseline market shares. However, we do not impose
restrictions on the type of distribution and minima and also study additional pricing regimes,
HBPD with leakage and with a peg, besides HBPD and UP.
Our analysis provides other novel insights. We show that, with heterogeneous switching
costs across firms with asymmetric market shares, there are circumstances in which a chal-
lenger firm with small market share and a customer base with relatively low switching costs
will prefer non-discriminatory pricing, even if faced with a larger incumbent with a customer
10For example, a 2014 YouGov survey of banking customers concludes that few people display unwavering
loyalty to their provider, and two in five banking customers state that they would consider switching their
account to another provider. Similarly, a GfK survey conducted in the course of the CMA’s 2016 energy
market investigation found that, with electricity being a homogeneous product, no factor other than price
was relevant to energy customers.
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base with relatively high switching costs. Hence, there is not always a prisoners’ dilemma, in
contrast to the Hotelling-based model of Thisse and Vives [1988]. In fact, we show that there
exit even circumstances in which the challenger’s poaching price exceeds the price charged
to its locked-in customers. We also show that the incumbent may use history-based price
discrimination as a means to deter entry by a uniform-pricing challenger.
Furthermore, our model of HBPD with leakage adds a new perspective on MFCCs. Unlike
in Besanko and Lyon [1993], where MFCCs apply to all customers indiscriminately and thus
act as a non-discrimination commitment device, in our setting the use of MFCCs amounts
to a form of third-degree price discrimination. Here we find a different type of prisoners’
dilemma, whereby both firms would be better off under the common use of MFCCs but
none of them has a unilateral incentive to adopt MFCCs. In particular, an incumbent with
high market shares and relatively high switching costs can anticipate that the smaller rival
has strong incentives not to reciprocate but stick to the use of vanilla HBPD. Therefore, an
asymmetric regulatory intervention aimed at imposing leakage only on the large incumbent
would tend to favour the challenger firm.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 details our modelling framework and its
underlying assumptions. Section 3 characterises HBPD outcomes, which represents our
baseline. Section 4 contrasts the results on HBPD with uniform pricing. In doing so, the
section also explores the potential of price discrimination as a means for the incumbent to
deter entry by a uniform-pricing challenger. Section 5 and 6 discusses HBPD with leakage
and a peg, respectively. Section 7 provides a welfare comparison of the outcomes. And
Section 8 concludes.
2 Model Setting and Assumptions
Suppose customers are spread uniformly on the unit interval, and two firms, A and B,
producing a homogeneous product, are located at x0, so that A’s market share is x0 ∈ (0, 1)
and B’s market share is 1−x0. Market shares are taken as predetermined, but – as in Chen
[1997] – it turns out that they do not matter when prices are discriminatory, except in cases
when the heterogeneity of customer switching costs itself is tied to market shares and, it
turns out, when prices are discriminatory, but subject to pegging constraints.
Unlike in Chen [1997]’s model where both firms’ customers have uniformly and identically
distributed switching costs, suppose customers of firm A have switching costs sA that are
distributed with CDF ΦA(s) for s ∈ SA ⊆ R+, and customers of firm B have switching
costs sB with CDF ΦB(s), s ∈ SB ⊆ R+. Our setting allows for heterogeneity of the
distribution of switching costs of the two firms’ customer bases, except when S = SA = SB
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and ΦA(s) = ΦB(s) for all s ∈ S. Firms do not observe their or their rival’s customers’
switching costs, but they know their respective distributions. We assume that both CDFs
are continuously differentiable so that their pdfs φA(s) and φB(s) exist.
As in Chen [1997], let qij denote the levels of historic demand at firm j that currently
accrues at firm i, with i, j ∈ {A,B}. So when i 6= j, this is the demand firm j loses when firm
i poaches firm j’s customers. Let pi denote firm i’s locked-in price, and pip firm i’s poaching
price, which can be thought of as pi net of an inducement mi that i offers to j’s customers
who switch to i. We assume throughout that consumers’ valuations for the homogeneous
product exceed prices.
We make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: (Monotone Likelihood Ratio, MLR)
φA(s)
φB(s)
≥ φA(t)
φB(t)
∀s ≥ t; s ∈ SA, t ∈ SB.
The MLR assumption has been discussed and used widely in microeconomic theory [Athey,
2002, Lebrun, 1998, Maskin and Riley, 2000].
The MLR assumption implies that the distribution of firm A’s customers’ switching
costs ΦA first-order stochastically dominates that of firm B’s customers’ switching costs, i.e.
ΦA(s) ≤ ΦB(s) for all s ∈ SA ∪ SB.11 It also implies that E[sA] ≥ E[sB].12 So firm A’s
customers are more likely to have higher switching costs than firm B’s, and their average
switching costs are also higher. That suggests that firm A’s customers are more likely to be
locked-in than firm B’s.
Furthermore, the MLR assumption implies the hazard rate (H) inequality:13
φB(s)
1− ΦB(s) ≥
φA(s)
1− ΦA(s) ∀s ∈ SA ∪ SB.
This inequality implies that, for any s, firm A’s demand exhibits a lower own-price elasticity
than firm B’s demand.
Similarly, the MLR assumption implies the reverse hazard rate (RH) inequality:
φA(s)
ΦA(s)
≥ φB(s)
ΦB(s)
∀s ∈ SA ∪ SB.
This inequality, in turn, implies that, for any s, firm A’s demand lost to firm B exhibits a
11This follows from rearranging, integrating w.r.t. t over SA ∪ SB and then integrating up to s. It is
obvious if supSB ≤ inf SA.
12This follows from φB(t)sφA(s) ≥ φA(t)sφB(s), integrating w.r.t. s and t over SA ∪ SB .
13This follows from rearranging and integrating w.r.t. t up from s.
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higher cross-price elasticity than firm B’s demand lost to firm A.
Consider two further assumptions.
Assumption 2: The hazard rates are weakly increasing, i.e.
φi(s)
1− Φi(s) ≤
φi(t)
1− Φi(t) ∀s ≤ t; s, t ∈ Si, i = A,B.
This assumptions holds for the uniform distribution and the Weibull distribution with
shape parameter greater than or equal to unity.14 It implies that the firms’ own-price
elasticities are weakly increasing.
Assumption 3: The reverse hazard rates are weakly decreasing, i.e.
φi(s)
Φi(s)
≥ φi(t)
Φi(t)
∀s ≤ t; s, t ∈ Si, i = A,B.
This assumption holds whenever the pdf is bounded. This assumption does not imply
that the cross-price elasticities of the firm’s lost demand are monotonic, however.
3 History-Based Price Discrimination
In this section we develop the baseline HBPD model. A Nash equilibrium in our setting
involves firm specific prices p and discounts m, (pA, pB,ma,mB). Given these, firm A’s
marginal customer has switching costs σA = pA− pB +mB, and firm B’s marginal customer
has σB = pB − pA +mA. Therefore,
qAA = x0Pr (sA ≥ σa) = x0 (1− ΦA (σA))
qBA = x0ΦA(σA)
qBB = (1− x0) (1− ΦB (σB))
qAB = (1− x0)ΦB(σB).
Assume firms have the same marginal cost c. Then, the firms’ profits are given by
piA(pA,mA; pB,mB) = (pA − c)x0 (1− ΦA (σA)) + (pA − c−mA)(1− x0)ΦB(σB)
piB(pB,mB; pA,mA) = (pB − c)(1− x0) (1− ΦB (σB)) + (pB − c−mB)xoΦA(σA).
14The Weibull CDF is given by F (s) = 1 − exp(−γsθ), for s ∈ R and scale parameter γ > 0 and shape
parameter θ > 0; θ = 1 yields the exponential CDF. Its hazard rate is weakly increasing for θ ≥ 1 and
decreasing for θ < 1.
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The firms’ profit maximization problems yield the following first-order conditions,15
p∗A − c =
1− ΦA(σ∗A)
φA(σ∗A)
p∗B − c =
1− ΦB(σ∗B)
φB(σ∗B)
p∗A − c−m∗A =
ΦB(σ
∗
B)
φB(σ∗B)
p∗B − c−m∗B =
ΦA(σ
∗
A)
φA(σ∗A)
,
where p∗i and m
∗
i denote firm i’s optimal price and discount, and σ
∗
i = p
∗
i − p∗j + m∗j , i, j ∈
{A,B} and i 6= j. As in Chen [1997], the initial market shares x0 and 1− x0 do not matter
for the firms’ optimal strategy – unless the distributions of the customers’ switching costs
themselves are functions of the initial market shares.16
The first-order conditions permit some initial insights into per-unit margins. They show
that a firm’s per-unit margin on retained customers is larger (smaller) than the per-unit
margin of its rival on its poached customers if the marginal customer’s switching cost is
below (above) the median switching costs of its customer base. By the definition of σA and
σB however, the first-order conditions imply
σ∗A =
1− 2ΦA(σ∗A)
φA(σ∗A)
σ∗B =
1− 2ΦB(σ∗B)
φB(σ∗B)
,
and so in order for σ∗A ≥ 0 and σ∗B ≥ 0, it needs to be the case that both are no larger than
the median of the respective switching cost distributions. Hence, the per-unit margin earned
on retained customers exceeds the one earned by the rival on the firm’s poached customers.
Defining the elasticity of firm j’s demand qij accruing to firm i with respect to firm i’s
15The derivation uses the fact that the first-order conditions with respect to mA and mB eliminate the
derivative of the second summand in piA and piB with respect to pA and pB , respectively.
16This could arise, for example, as a consequence of network effects. See, for example, the discussion in
Farrell and Klemperer [2007]. An alternative explanation could be that normally consumer inertia takes
time to set in, so firms that have been active for longer are bound to have a larger stock of “back-book”
customers and thus a larger customer base than newer firms that can only grow gradually as they compete
for the new cohort of unaffiliated consumers and manage to retain them long enough for them to mature
into “back-book” customers.
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price charged to firm j’s customers by qij ,pji(σj), the first-order conditions imply
p∗A − c
p∗A
= − 1
qAA,pA(σ
∗
A)
p∗B − c
p∗B
= − 1
qBB ,pB(σ
∗
B)
p∗A − c−m∗A
p∗A −m∗A
=
1
qAB ,pA−mA(σ
∗
B)
p∗B − c−m∗B
p∗B −m∗B
=
1
qBA,pB−mB(σ
∗
A)
.
So the relative profit margins are seen to be inversely proportional to the own and cross
price elasticities of the respective firm level demands for the marginal customers. This
is noteworthy because it shows that any discount offered to specific groups of customers
depends on the magnitude of the firm’s own price elasticity of demand relative to the cross
price elasticity of its rival’s lost demand, for the respective marginal customers in equilibrium.
Under our assumptions, we can obtain the following results.
Lemma 3.1: Under Assumptions 1-3, σ∗A ≥ σ∗B.
Proof: Assumption 1 implies H and RH. Suppose the opposite were true, i.e. σA < σB.
Then, by RH and Assumption 3, for σ∗A < s < σ
∗
B,
ΦA(σ
∗
A)
φA(σ∗A)
≤ ΦA(s)
φA(s)
≤ ΦB(s)
φB(s)
≤ ΦB(σ
∗
B)
φB(σ∗B)
,
and so the last two first-order conditions imply p∗B−m∗B ≤ p∗A−m∗A. H and Assumption
2 imply,
1− ΦB(σ∗B)
φB(σ∗B)
≤ 1− ΦB(s)
φB(s)
≤ 1− ΦA(s)
φA(s)
≤ 1− ΦA(σ
∗
A)
φA(σ∗A)
,
and the first two first-order conditions in turn imply p∗B ≤ p∗A. Therefore, the two
inequalities imply σ∗B = p
∗
B − p∗A +m∗A ≤ p∗A − p∗B +m∗B = σ∗A, a contradiction. 
The Lemma has the interpretation that firm A’s marginal customer that firm B induces
to switch has a higher switching cost than firm B’s marginal customer.
The preceding Lemma is useful in order to establish the following
Proposition 3.1: Under Assumption 4, p∗B ≤ p∗A, and m∗B ≤ m∗A.
Proof: From σ∗A ≥ σ∗B and the first-order conditions, it follows that 2(p∗A − p∗B) ≥
m∗A −m∗B. So it is sufficient to prove that m∗A ≥ m∗B.
11
From the definitions of σA and σB,
σ∗A + σ
∗
B = m
∗
A +m
∗
B,
and from the first-order conditions,
σ∗A = p
∗
A − p∗B +m∗B = m∗A +
ΦB(σ
∗
B)
φB(σ∗B)
− ΦA(σ
∗
A)
φA(σ∗A)
σ∗B = p
∗
B − p∗A +m∗A = m∗B +
ΦA(σ
∗
A)
φA(σ∗A)
− ΦB(σ
∗
B)
φB(σ∗B)
.
Lemma 2.1, together with Assumption 3, implies that
ΦB(σ
∗
B)
φB(σ
∗
B)
− ΦA(σ∗A)
φA(σ
∗
A)
≤ 0. Therefore,
0 ≤ m∗A − σ∗A = σ∗B −m∗B, and hence
m∗B ≤ σ∗B ≤ σ∗A ≤ m∗A.

The preceding result shows that, with heterogeneous switching costs, the firm with the
more locked-in customer base charges a higher price. At the same time, it must offer a larger
discount to its price in order to induce its rival’s customer to switch because these customers
tend to have lower switching costs.
The model by Chen [1997], for the second period in a two-period game with payments
for customers to switch, is a special case of this general framework, with φA(s) = φB(s) =
1
θ
1{s∈[0,θ]}, θ > 0.
4 Uniform Pricing
4.1 Characterisation of Uniform Pricing Outcomes
As explained in the introduction, uniform pricing may be re-instituted as the result of
regulatory interventions banning the use of price discrimination altogether or imposing a
duty on firms to move their existing customers on their best tariff. It is interesting to
compare the history-based price discrimination outcome of Proposition 2.1 with a situation
in which the firms charge uniform prices. In this situation, either some of firm A’s customer
switch – if firm A’s uniform price puA exceeds firm B’s uniform price p
u
B –, or some of firm
B’s customers switch, but not both.
Consider the first of these two cases, with firm A’s marginal customer’s switching cost
σuA = p
u
A − puB > 0. Assume henceforth that 0 = min{s : s ∈ SA} = min{s : s ∈ SB}. The
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firms’ demands are then
quA = x0 (1− ΦA(σuA))
quB = 1− x0 + x0ΦA(σuA).
Clearly, only the distribution of switching costs of firm A’s customers who are at risk of
switching matters in this case. The distribution of firm B’s customers’ switching cost is
immaterial.
The firms’ profits are
piuA(p
u
A, p
u
B) = (pA − c)x0 (1− ΦA(σuA))
piuB(p
u
A, p
u
B) = (pB − c) (1− x0 + x0ΦA(σuA)) ,
and the first-order conditions for the firms’ profit maximization problems yield
p∗uA − c =
1− ΦA(σ∗uA )
φA(σ∗uA )
p∗uB − c =
1− x0 + x0ΦA(σ∗uA )
x0φA(σ∗uA )
.
Therefore,
σ∗uA = p
∗u
A − p∗uB
=
2x0 (1− ΦA(σ∗uA ))− 1
x0φA(σ∗uA )
.
The final equation shows that x0 ≥ 12 is a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium
with p∗uA > p
∗u
B to exist.
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The expression for σ∗uA also shows that σ
∗u
A and hence the optimal uniform prices depend
on x0. In particular, if ΦA has a relatively high probability mass on low values of sA, then σ
∗u
A
tends to be small, and the more so that the closer x0 is to
1
2
. This, in turn, means that firm
B’s price is not much lower than firm A’s price - regardless of how skewed the distribution
of switching costs of firm B’s customers is towards high or low values.18 While the situation
of ΦA (and / or ΦB) having high probability mass on sets of low values of switching costs
may appear inconsistent with the notion of a mature market, such situations may arise as
a consequence of a regulatory intervention that is aimed at lowering the switching costs of
17Note that σuA = 0 implies that the righthand side is strictly positive for x0 > 0, so that by continuity
σ∗uA > 0. Again, Chen [1997] provides a special case of this result.
18This is not an issue in models like Chen [1997] that assume homogeneous switching costs.
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larger portions of consumers.19
Also, in that case, firm B may be better off employing a price-discrimination strategy
because it would allow it to target and segment consumers with different switching costs in
its own customer base. It is easy to construct examples that exhibit that feature.
Example: Suppose Φi(s) = 1− exp(−γisα), i = A,B, with γA = 4, γB = 3, α = 1 (i.e.
exponential) and x0 = 0.55.
20 Then, p∗A =
1
4
, p∗B =
1
3
, m∗A = 0.0759, m
∗
B = 0.2159, and
piA = 0.1107 and piB = 0.1196; while p
∗u
A =
1
4
and p∗uB = 0.2342, and pi
u
A = 0.1291 and
piuB = 0.1133. So firm B would be better off if it could price discriminate, while the
opposite is true for firm A.
For comparison, if γA = 3 and γB = 4, i.e. ΦA first-order stochastically dominates
ΦB, then p
∗u
A =
1
3
and p∗uB = 0.3123, with profits pi
u
A = 0.1721 and pi
u
B = 0.1510; with
history-based price discrimination, p∗A =
1
3
, p∗B =
1
4
,m∗A = 0.2077 and m
∗
B = 0.0896,
and profits piA = 0.1313 and piB = 0.1041. So in this case, both firms would be better
off with uniform pricing.
The first part of the example shows that with heterogeneous switching costs and asymmet-
ric historic market shares, in the terminology of Belleflamme and Peitz [2010] the competition
and surplus extraction effects may operate differently for the two firms. And that may lead
them to prefer different pricing strategies.
The second part of the example shows that there are circumstances in which both
firms’ uniform prices exceed those under HBPD, and both firms earn higher profits with
uniform prices than with discriminatory prices. This is consistent with the finding that price
discrimination under oligopoly can intensify pricing rivalry when competing firms exhibit
best-response asymmetry in that they hold opposing views as to which consumers are strong
and which are instead weak [Armstrong, 2006a].
Table 1 summarize the example and, in the second panel, provides a further illustration
of the general Weibull case, with shape parameter θ = 3
2
. Increasing the shape parameter
moves probability mass towards the upper tail of the distribution. As a consequence, prices
and profits rise relative to the exponential case.
The examples also illustrate the following proposition which states that, under our
assumptions on heterogeneous switching costs, uniform prices exceed discriminatory prices,
even for back-book customers.
Proposition 4.1: Under Assumptions 1-3, p∗uA ≥ p∗A and p∗uB ≥ p∗B.
19For example, this may be thanks to interventions such as Open Banking which is meant to reduce the
inconvenience of disengaged consumers when shopping around.
20Note that in this example, ΦB first-order stochastically dominates ΦA.
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Proof: It is sufficient to prove that σ∗uA ≤ σ∗A which implies, by the first-order conditions
for firm A and Assumption 2, that p∗uA ≥ p∗A. This, together with σ∗A > σ∗B > 0 under
HBPD, as shown in Lemma 2.1, by Assumption 2 implies also p∗uB ≥ p∗B.21
Suppose to the contrary that σ∗uA > σ
∗
A. Then, p
∗u
A ≤ p∗A by the first-order conditions
and Assumption 2. This ranking of prices of firm A, together with the supposition,
implies also that p∗uB ≤ p∗B −m∗B.22 Therefore, p∗uB − c ≤ p∗B − c−m∗B, and hence
1− x0 + x0ΦA(σ∗uA )
x0φA(σ∗uA )
≤ ΦA(σ
∗
A)
φA(σ∗)
.
Notice that x0 = 1 implies σ
∗u
A = σ
∗
A. Since the lefthand side of the inequality is
decreasing in x0, Assumption A3 implies that σ
∗u
A < σ
∗
A for
1
2
< x0 < 1, a contradiction
to the supposition. 
The Proposition shows that, if the large, established firm has a customer base that finds
it relatively more costly to switch, compared to the challenger firm, then uniform prices are
higher than prices for locked-in customers under HBPD. This result is of policy relevance as
it is often argued that non-discriminatory interventions are aimed at protecting unengaged
customers from exploitation. Our result shows that there exist circumstances in which such
interventions would harm locked-in customers. As a purely technical matter, Assumption 1
is not needed for the determination of the uniform prices because only the distribution of
firm A’s customers’ switching costs matter.
This outcome may be surprising for policy practitioners, given the tendency to consider
higher “lock-in” prices under HBPD as unfairly exploitative. We think that the key difference
is that we rely on a smooth distribution of heterogeneous switching costs. The result
would differ if the distribution of switching costs instead was neatly partitioned between
two binary values, high and low switching costs. Under such a scenario, locked-in prices
would arguably increase compared to uniform prices, as the rivals poaching price would not
exert any constraint whatsoever.
Note that our argument implies that, while σ∗uA ≤ σ∗A, for x0 high enough σ∗uA ≥ σ∗A−σ∗B.
So for high initial market share x0, firm A looses more market share under uniform prices than
under HBPD. Therefore, this type of intervention would give rise to a trade-off between the
competition policy objective of sponsoring the challenger firm and the consumer protection
objective of protecting “back-book” consumers, but in the opposite direction to what is
intended, as under uniform pricing consumers are worse off while the challenger can expand
21The situation of uniform prices is akin to σ∗B = 0, i.e. none of firm B’s customers switch. Assumption 2
then implies that p∗B for σ
∗
B > 0 is lower than the corresponding price if σB were zero.
22This is because, under the supposition, p∗A − p∗uA > p∗uA − p∗uB = σ∗uA > σ∗A = p∗A − p∗B +m∗B .
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more. This result contrasts with Result 2 in Gehrig et al. [2011] that shows that the market
share of the dominant firm is larger under uniform pricing than under HBPD, because under
the linear structure of their Hotelling framework the dominant firm finds it very costly to
poach distant customers of the rival firm, thereby insulating the smaller firm from poaching
by its dominant rival.
4.2 Asymmetric Pricing: Price Discrimination as Entry Deter-
rence
We next examine whether a firm has an incentive to poach its rival’s customers by unilateral
price discrimination. We first focus on HBPD by the incumbent, vis-‘a-vis a challenger with
a uniform price. This case is of interest in its own right because there is a general view that
firms applying HBPD have an advantage when meeting competition from firms applying
uniform pricing. This instance is particularly relevant when evaluating the potential of
HBPC by the incumbent as a means of deterring entry. An entrants, by definition, has no
customer base, so on the part of the entrant there is no scope for price discrimination.23
For example, Financial Conduct Authority [2015], Annex 1.4, mentions in particular that
small cash savings providers typically treat existing and new customers equally and consider
“teaser” rates and “new customers only bonus” deals offered by large incumbents as barriers
to entry.
When the incumbent, firm A, price discriminates, while the challenger, firm B, applies a
uniform price, then pA ≥ pB ≥ pA −mA, so that firm A’s marginal customer has switching
costs σA = pA−pB, while firm B’s marginal customer has switching costs σB = pB−pA+mA,
i.e. switching occurs in both directions. Then,
qAA = x0 (1− ΦA(σA))
qBA = x0ΦA(σA)
qBB = (1− x0) (1− ΦB(σB))
qAB = (1− x0)ΦB(σB),
23Entry deterrence in the presence of switching costs absent price discrimination and with complete
information has been studied by Klemperer [1987] who considers limit pricing, i.e. cuts in a uniform price to
deter entry; and by Farrell and Shapiro [1988] who show that when an incumbent cannot price discriminate
switching costs can actually promote entry. All-unit discounts - that apply once a buyer has exceeded a
sales target - as a means of partial foreclosure has been considered by Chao et al. [2018] and Ide et al. [2016]
in models with captive customers. Ordover and Shaffer [2013] consider exclusionary contracts between two
asymmetric sellers and a single buyer in a two-period setting where the buyer incurs a switching cost when
switching away from the first-period seller.
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so that firms’ profits are
piA = (pA − c)x0 (1− ΦA(σA)) + (pA − c−mA)(1− x0)ΦB(σB)
piB = (pb − c) ((1− x0) (1− ΦB(σB)) + x0ΦA(σA)) .
The profit maximizing prices then satisfy
p∗A − c =
1− ΦA(σ∗A)
φA(σ∗A)
p∗A − c−m∗A =
ΦB(σ
∗
B)
φB(σ∗B)
p∗B − c =
(1− x0) (1− ΦB(σ∗B)) + x0ΦA(σ∗A)
(1− x0)φB(σ∗B) + x0φA(σ∗A)
.
These, in turn, yield profits
pi∗A = x0
(1− ΦA(σ∗A))2
φA(σ∗A)
+ (1− x0)ΦB(σ
∗
B)
2
φB(σ∗B)
pi∗B =
((1− x0) (1− ΦB(σ∗B)) + x0ΦA(σ∗A))2
(1− x0)φB(σ∗B) + x0φA(σ∗A)
.
When both firms price uniformly, profits are
pi∗uA = x0
(1− ΦA(σ∗uA ))2
φA(σ∗uA )
pi∗uB =
(1− x0 + x0ΦA(σ∗uA ))2
x0φA(σ∗uA )
.
Proposition 4.2: Under Assumptions 1-3, pi∗A < pi
∗u
A .
Proof : Because unlike in the uniform pricing outcome firm A poaches firm B’s cus-
tomers, some of whom switch to firm A, p∗B < p
∗u
B and p
∗
A ≥ p∗uA . Hence, p∗A − p∗B >
p∗uA − p∗uB and so σ∗A > σ∗uA . By Assumption 2, it follows that the expected profit
the incumbent firm A makes on a retained customer is lower when the incumbent
discriminates against a uniform pricing challenger than when A responds with a uni-
form price, i.e.
(1−ΦA(σ∗A))
2
φA(σ
∗
A)
<
(1−ΦA(σ∗uA ))
2
φA(σ
∗u
A )
. The reason is that the discriminatory
price set to retained customers is set with respect to the more elastic portion of the
expected demand curve of retained customers than under uniform pricing, because
σ∗A > σ
∗u
A , hence the expected revenue from retained customers is lower. In contrast,
with uniform pricing the incumbent sets the price such that the elasticity of expected
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demand of retained customers is smallest. This maximises expected revenue from
retained customers.
The incumbent sets the poaching price, in turn, with respect to the expected demand
from switching customers. Under our assumptions, their expected demand is uniformly
more elastic than that for the incumbents’ own customers, so the expected revenue
obtained from switchers is lower than that from retained customers under uniform
pricing.
The combined expected revenue is a convex combination of the expected revenues
obtained from retained and poached customers and therefore is also lower. Hence, the
incumbents best response to uniform pricing of the challenger is to set a uniform price
as well. 
This result is illustrated by the last set of columns in Table 1 in the Weibull example.
It follows from Proposition 3.1 that the incumbent has an incentive to price discriminate
when the challenger price discriminates. So for the incumbent, price discrimination is not
always a dominant strategy.
For the challenger, in turn, poaching the incumbent’s customers by means of a discrim-
inatory, discounted price is a best response when m∗B in Proposition 1 satisfies m
∗
B > 0.
This is not necessarily the case. In fact, the third and fourth panel of Table 1 provide
examples in which m∗B = 0 – i.e. the challenger’s optimal response to a price-discriminating
incumbent is to charge a uniform price – and m∗B < 0 – i.e. the challenger poaches the
incumbent’s customers with a price that exceeds the price charged to the challenger’s locked-
in customers.24 Nonetheless, both outcomes are dominated by both firms charging a uniform
price.
These outcomes differ from results like in Thisse and Vives [1988] where price-discrimination
is always a dominant strategy for both firms. In our setting, except for special cases, a firm’s
best response to a given pricing strategy - uniform, vs. discriminatory - is to match it.
However, the outcomes under uniform pricing dominate those under discriminatory pricing
in terms of the expected profit they induce. 25 And in the case of asymmetric interventions
whereby the non-discriminatory rule applies solely to the larger incumbent, the challenger
24We are indebted to Ken Hori for pointing this out.
25Unlike in Thisse and Vives [1988], consumer heterogeneity is due to different levels of switching costs
which only switchers pay. Whereas, Thisse and Vives [1988] model consumer heterogeneity based on different
levels of transport costs (i.e., as being geographically differentiated) which are borne by every consumer, so
that delivered prices reflect different levels of transport costs for each consumer, depending on the consumer’s
and the firms’ locations.
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may choose to reciprocate by means of uniform pricing, rather than to stick to the use of
HBPD.
Example: (continued) For the case γA = 3 and γB = 4, with x0 = 0.55, the prices are
given by puA = 0.1915, p
L
B =
1
4
and mB = 0.1477. These yield profits piA = 0.0986 and
piB = 0.1022.
Finally, in order to investigate the incumbent’s HBPD as an entry deterrence strategy,
suppose that the market is dynamic, in the sense that over time some customers leave the
market while others join the market. Specifically, for a market size τ , suppose that the
fraction of ’new’ customers that the challenger can capture, (1 − x0)τ , to ’old’ customers
served by the incumbent, x0τ , is a constant κ =
1−x0
x0
, and that τ itself is ex ante uncertain.
Then the challenger’s profits - when pricing uniformly and facing a price discriminating
incumbent and conditional on x0 - are
pi∗B(τ) = τ
(κ (1− ΦB(σ∗B)) + ΦA(σ∗A))2
κφB(σ∗B) + φA(σ
∗
A)
.
Notice that
σ∗A = p
∗
A − p∗B =
1− ΦA(σ∗A)
φA(σ∗A)
− κ (1− ΦB(σ
∗
B)) + ΦA(σ
∗
A)
κφB(σ∗B) + φA(σ∗A)
σ∗B = p
∗
B − p∗A +m∗A =
κ (1− ΦB(σ∗B)) + ΦA(σ∗A)
κφB(σ∗B) + φA(σ∗A)
− ΦB(σ
∗
b )
φB(σ∗B)
,
i.e. the switching costs of the marginal customer depend on κ, but not on τ .
Then, if the challenger firm has not entered the market yet, its expected profit from
entering is given by
E [pi∗B(τ)] = E [τ ]
(κ (1− ΦB(σ∗B)) + ΦA(σ∗A))2
κφB(σ∗B) + φA(σ
∗
A)
,
When the incumbent prices uniformly,
E[pi∗uB (τ)] = E [τ ]
(κ+ ΦA(σ
∗u
A ))
2
φA(σ∗uA )
,
and this is seen to exceed E[pi∗B(x0)].26 So, as the challenger compares expected profit from
entry with any sunk cost associated with entry, price discrimination on the part of the
26The numerator of the fraction inside the expectation is larger for every x0 because σ
∗u
A ≥ σ∗A, and the
denominator is smaller.
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incumbent, as opposed to uniform pricing, erects a higher entry barrier for a uniform-pricing
challenger.
5 Leakage (MFCCs)
By leakage we mean that a firm offers its inducement mLj , j = A,B, aimed at its rival’s
customers as in section 3, to its own customers as well. This can be viewed as a most-
favoured customer clause (MFCC).27 Some regulators, such as the FCA, consider encouraging
this type of MFCC, e.g. by means of “disclosure remedies” [Financial Conduct Authority,
2018a] that aim at providing consumers with better information on the benefits of shopping
around and switching provider.28
MFCCs have been considered by Besanko and Lyon [1993]. In their analysis, they treat
MFCCs as an insurance for customers, in the sense that the firm adopting an MFCC cannot
discriminate between customers and must charge the same price to all customers. In our
analysis, MFCCs are treated as an option offered to existing customers that they may or
may not exercise, depending on their idiosyncratic inertia. This is motivated, for example,
by features of the UK cash savings market where providers report that informing existing
customers about better accounts with higher interest rates only generates a small response in
(internal) switching (Financial Conduct Authority [2015], Annex 1.2).29 Another difference
between the model of Besanko and Lyon [1993] and ours is that our model determines inert,
locked-in customers endogenously, while in the model of Besanko and Lyon [1993] the number
of “non-shoppers” is exogenously given.
Suppose internal switching is only a fraction α ∈ (0, 1) as costly as external switching.
In this setting, both firms offer a poaching price, below their respective regular price. Some
customers of both firms switch internally to the sweetened tariff (internal switcher), and
some stay (are locked in) at the regular price. External switching is only in one direction,
to the firm with the lower poaching price.30
Denote the level of switching costs of the marginal internal switcher by σij, and the
switching costs of the marginal external switcher by σej , j = A,B. Then, if p
L
j denotes the
27See Akman and Hviid [2006] for a discussion of MFCCs from the perspective of competition law.
28For example, Financial Conduct Authority [2018a] considers a “return switching form [...], a simple
‘tear-off’ form and pre-paid envelope which would enable a customer to switch to a better paying [cash
savings] account offered by their existing provider more easily (internal switching).”
29The “never knowingly undersold” best-price promise by some UK retailers provides another, similar
example.
30This is shown in Lemma 4.2 below.
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price charged to locked-in customers,
pLj = p
L
j −mLj + ασij
pLj −mLj + ασej = pLk −mLk + σej , j, k = A,B; j 6= k.
Therefore,
σij =
mLj
α
σej =
{
pLj −pLk−(mLj −mLk )
1−α if p
L
j − pLk − (mLj −mLk ) > 0
0 o.w.
, j, k = A,B; j 6= k.
Lemma 5.1: σij > σ
e
j , j = A,B.
Proof: Suppose, to the contrary, that σij < σ
e
j . Then, a customer of firm j with s such
that σij < s < σ
e
j , switches externally, but not internally, iff
pLk −mLk + s < pjL −mLj + αs,
or iff
(1− α)s < pLj − pLk − (mLj −mLk ).
A customer of firm j with s′ < σij switches internally, but not externally, iff
pLk −mLk + s′ > pjL −mLj + αs′,
or iff
(1− α)s′ > pLj − pLk − (mLj −mLk ).
But then, s′ > s, a contradiction. 
Lemma 5.2: σ∗eA > 0 (and σ
∗e
B = 0) if, and only if, x0 ≥ 12 .
Proof: Suppose external switching is from A to B and σeA > 0. Then,
piLA = x0(p
L
A − c) (1− ΦA(σeA))−mLAx0
(
ΦA(σ
i
A)− ΦA(σeA)
)
piLB = (1− x0)(pLB − c)−mLB(1− x0)ΦB
(
σiB
)
+ x0(p
L
B − c−mLB)ΦA (σeA) .
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The first-order conditions for the firms’ profit maximization problem yield
σ∗iA =
m∗LA
α
=
1− ΦA(σ∗iA )
φA(σ∗iA )
σ∗iB =
m∗LB
α
=
1− ΦB(σ∗iB )
φB(σ∗iB )
p∗LA − c−m∗LA
1− α =
1− ΦA(σ∗eA )
φA(σ∗eA )
p∗LB − c−m∗LB
1− α =
1− x0 + x0ΦA(σ∗eA )
x0φA(σ∗eA )
.
Therefore,
σ∗eA =
p∗LA − c−m∗LA
1− α −
p∗LB − c−m∗LB
1− α
=
2x0 (1− ΦA(σ∗eA ))− 1
x0φa(σ∗eA )
,
which shows that σeA > 0 if, and only if, x0 ≥ 12 . 
Corollary 5.1: σ∗eA = σ
∗u
A .
This corollary to Lemma 5.2 follows immediately from the last equality in the proof of
the preceding lemma. It shows that firm A’s marginal customer who is indifferent between
staying with A and externally switching to firm B is the same as in the case of uniform
pricing.
Proposition 5.1: Given x0 >
1
2
and Assumptions 1-3, m∗LA ≥ m∗LB and p∗LA ≥ p∗LB .
Proof: Assumptions 1-3 imply that the first two first-order conditions of the firms’
profit maximization problem imply σ∗iA ≥ σ∗iB , and hence m∗LA ≥ m∗LB . Lemma 3 then
implies that p∗LA − p∗LB ≥ 0. 
Example: (continued) Suppose again that γA = 4 and γB = 3, and let α = 0.4. Then,
m∗LA = 0.1000, m
∗L
B = 0.1333, p
∗L
A =
1
4
and p∗LB = 0.2739. So locked-in prices are no
less than uniform prices. However, with x0 = 0.55, this yields profits pi
L
A = 0.0977 and
piLB = 0.0900. So, compared to the outcome with uniform pricing and with history-
based price discrimination, both firms are worse off.
In the case of γA = 3 and γB = 4, again with α = 0.4 and x0 = 0.55, m
∗L
A = 0.1333,
m∗LB = 0.1, p
∗
A =
1
3
and p∗LB = 0.2874, with profits pi
L
A = 0.1303 and pi
L
B = 0.1072. So
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compared to history-based price discrimination, firm A is less profitable and firm B is
more profitable.
If internal switching is less costly, then in this example MFCCs become more profitable
for both firms: With γA = 3, γB = 4 and α = 0.05, m
∗L
A = 0.0167, m
∗L
B = 0.0125,
p∗LA =
1
3
and p∗LB = 0.3092, with profits pi
L
A = 0.1669 and pi
L
B = 0.1455. These are still
less than those under uniform pricing, however. Leakage neutralises the toughening
effect that the use of history-based price discrimination has on pricing rivalry, thanks
to the fact that firms can use their poaching price as a defensive tool.
The example shows that, whether or not MFCCs are profitable, relative to history-based
price discrimination without leakage, depends on the relative distribution of switching costs
between the two firms and the level of the cost of internal switching. Indeed, when the costs
of internal switching are very low, discriminatory prices are very close to those of the uniform
case.
Table 2 adds results for the Weibull case with θ = 3
2
and α = 0.4. Prices are higher than
in the absence of leakage, and in this case both firms profit from MFCCs.
Discussion: Unilateral Incentives
Does either firm have an incentive to unilaterally impose an MFCC (i.e. to allow leakage),
given its rival does not?
The example above shows that this question is only really relevant when the costs of
internal switching are sufficiently low and when the distribution of switching costs disadvan-
tages the larger firm. In this case, the larger, established firm’s customers are at relatively
higher risk of switching, and hence the larger firm would want to consider an MFCC as a
defencin contrast to what motivated the intervention in the first placee. But that would
mean that it will stem some of the outflow of customers to the challenger firm, while at the
same time applying its lower poaching price to a large fraction of its remaining customer
base. As α decreases, this fraction of the established firm’s customer base increases, while
the retention of marginal customers is eroded due to lower poaching prices of the challenger
firm. So the established firm will earn less on a large fraction of its customer base and hence
does not have an incentive to offer an MFCC unilaterally.
To the best of our knowledge there is no extant economic literature researching the
incentive to use MFCCs where customers face heterogeneous ‘hassle’ costs to claim for
compensation, so that it translates into a form of second-degree price discrimination. Be-
sanko and Lyon [1993] analyse firms’ incentives to adopt MFCCs where consumers are
partitioned between “non shoppers”, who never consider switching, and “shoppers”, who
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have no brand preference. However, the MFCC applies to every customer indiscriminately.
Therefore, the use of an MFCC amounts to a non-discrimination commitment device. In
our model this corresponds to a setting under uniform pricing where α is equal to zero. The
authors show that there can be configurations where firms have a unilateral incentive to
use contemporaneous MFCCs. They also show that the use of contemporaneous MFCCs
has a “band-wagon effect” whereby the more firms that adopt the practice in question, the
more compelling it is for remaining firms to follow suit. Although our results are consistent
with that effect, albeit only for a limited set of parameters, we find that the firms lack the
incentives to trigger it in the first place.
On the one hand, the comparative analysis presented above suggests that the imposition
of measures intended to encourage internal switching by regulators may well be detrimental
to consumers, unless market shares are sufficiently skewed and/or the relative inconvenience
of external switching is not too high. On the other hand, these results also suggest that firms
might strategically react to the imposition of “leakage” by improving the relative convenience
of their internal switching.
As a corollary, an asymmetric regulatory intervention whereby the imposition of “leakage”
is solely directed at the larger firm can materially increase the smaller rival’s profit, in
particular for low values of α, primarily at the expense of its locked-in customers, in contrast
to what motivated the intervention in the first place.
6 Pegged Prices - Ratio-Based Price Regulation
Another regulatory intervention that has been proposed recently by the FCA is to constrain
the dispersion of discriminatory prices, by pegging the magnitude of discounts to the level
of the regular, undiscounted price. We model this as bounding the ratio between the regular
and discounted prices, e.g. such that the discount mi is no more than a fraction β ∈ (0, 1)
of the regular price pi, i.e. mi ≤ βpi for i ∈ {A,B}.
Adding the constraints mA ≤ βpA and mB ≤ βpB to the firms’ profit maximization
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problems with HBPD, the solutions p∗PA , p
∗P
B ,m
∗P
A ,m
∗P
B now satisfy
p∗PA − c =
1− ΦA(σ∗PA )
φA(σ∗PA )
− λ∗A
β − 1
x0
p∗PB − c =
1− ΦB(σ∗PB )
φB(σ∗PB )
− λ∗B
β − 1
1− x0
p∗PA − c−m∗PA =
ΦB(σ
∗P
B )
φB(σ∗PB )
+ λ∗A
1
1− x0
p∗PB − c−m∗PB =
ΦA(σ
∗P
A )
φA(σ∗PA )
+ λ∗B
1
x0
,
where σ∗Pi are defined analogously to σ
∗
i and λ
∗
i ≥ 0 are the Lagrange multipliers on the
pegging constraints, i ∈ {A,B}. The Lagrange multipliers capture the increment to profits
from slackening the pegging constraint, i.e. they are zero when the pegging constraints do
not bind, and positive otherwise.
The first two first-order conditions imply that the regular, undiscounted prices p∗PA and
p∗PB exceed their counterparts when the pegging constraint is binding. The second two first-
order conditions imply that the discounted prices do as well. Hence, pegging discounts to
prices tends to lift prices up. Because profits are the sum of two profit components, from
retained and poached customers, both of which are linear in x0 and 1− x0 respectively, the
marginal increment of profits form slackening the pegging constraint are also a sum of two
components that are linear in x0 and 1− x0. Therefore, λ
∗
i
x0
decreases and
λ∗i
1−x0 increases as
x0 increases, i ∈ {A,B}. Therefore, the uplift on the regular price of the incumbent is more
muted and that for the challenger more accentuated the more entrenched the incumbent’s
position is; the converse applies to the discounted prices.
At the same time, clearly profits won’t be higher than absent pegging: They are equal
when the constraints do not bind, and they are smaller when they do.
Furthermore,
m∗PA =
1− ΦA(σ∗PA )
φA(σ∗PA )
− ΦB(σ
∗P
B )
φB(σ∗PB )
− λ∗A
(β − 1)(1− x0) + x0
x0(1− x0) .
Because the inherited market share of the incumbent, x0, exceeds the one of the challenger,
1 − x0, the numerator of the last ratio in the expression for m∗PA is negative, and hence
the optimal level of the incumbent’s discount m∗PA subject to the pegging constraint also
exceeds the optimal discount absent pegging. Analogously, whether or not this is true for
the challenger’s discount m∗PB depends on whether (β− 1)x0 is larger or smaller than 1−x0.
Table 3 illustrates these results, for β = 0.1 and the Weibull example. The example also
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shows that, while it is still the case that profits under uniform pricing are highest, the gain
in profit for the incumbent from unilaterally price discriminating subject to the constraint
when meeting a uniform-pricing challenger are substantially larger than absent the peg.31
7 Welfare
In our analysis, consumer surplus is defined as the difference between the (unspecified)
reservation valuation of the homogeneous good or service provided by the incumbent and
challenger firm, net of price and switching costs for those consumers who switch provider.
Therefore, ceteris paribus and comparing pricing regimes, higher prices and more entrenched
lock-in mean reduced surplus. In this regard, it is important to recognise that the extent
of consumer lock-in, or inertia, is endogenous because it is a function of the relative prices
accessible to the respective consumer.
Table 4 shows the probabilities of consumer lock-in across the pricing regimes considered
in our analysis. The top panel shows that uniform pricing entrenches consumer inertia
compared to HBPD. Since uniform prices are also higher than discriminatory prices, HBPD
dominates uniform pricing in terms of expected consumer welfare.
The middle panel shows that MFCCs facilitate internal switching and thereby reduce
consumer lock-in internal to the firm, but through the equilibrium price adjustment which
lifts up prices compared to HBPD induces only a small probability of external switching,
so that the probabilities of consumer retention for the incumbent are approximately those
under uniform pricing. So for consumers with high switching costs, MFCCs can be welfare
reducing compared to HBPD, because their inability to switch means that they pay higher
prices.
The bottom panel shows that ratio-based price regulation also entrenches consumer lock-
in. As the equilibrium adjustment to this type of constraint on prices is also to lift prices
above those under HBPD, ratio-based price regulation would also be expected to reduce
welfare.
So if the consumer protection objective is to safeguard consumer surplus of vulnerable
consumers who do not switch, HBPD absent any constraint emerges as the preferable regime.
But as shown in Section 4.2, a potential entrant who does not yet have the ability to price
discriminate and therefore charges a uniform price may not expect to earn profits that suffice
to cover any entry or set-up costs. If HBPD on the part of the incumbent precludes entry by
a challenger, then the consumer protection objective stands in conflict with the competition
policy objective of promoting competition for and in the market.
310.38 vs. 0.09, as opposed to 0.22 vs. 0.18.
26
8 Conclusions
This paper studies options for price regulation to protect vulnerable consumers in asymmetric
oligopolistic markets where firms’ customers have heterogeneous switching costs. We show
that in a setting with asymmetric market shares and heterogeneous switching costs price-
discrimination can be beneficial for consumers; that there exist circumstances where the
challenger may find uniform pricing a best response to a price-discriminating incumbent; and
where the challenger’s poaching price may exceed the price charged to its locked-in customers;
and that, unlike in a class of product-preference based models, price discrimination is not
a dominant strategy. We also demonstrate that when internal switching is significantly
more convenient than external switching to a rival firm disclosure remedies in the form of
price discrimination with leakage, or MFCCs, might dissipate much of the benefits of price
discrimination. The same is true in our setting for ratio-based price regulation.
Furthermore, we show that history-based price discrimination by an incumbent can deter
a challenger’s entry. This finding, in turn, implies that consumer protection objective may
be in conflict with competition objectives.
Our results are policy relevant. They evaluate the array of interventions at the disposal of
consumer protection agencies, in a setting with asymmetric market shares and heterogeneous
switching costs that are salient characteristics of many markets that have come or are under
regulatory scrutiny. And they will also become relevant for competition bodies, such as the
CMA, in light of the re-examination of legislative frameworks that aim at strengthening
competition regimes to better protect the vulnerable.32
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Table 1: Example: Weibull Distribution F (s) = 1− exp(−γsθ)
Firm Param. UP Profit HBPDaProfit UIb Profit
incumbent γ = 3 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.33
θ = 1 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.14
challenger γ = 4 0.31 0.15 0.25 0.21 0.10
θ = 1 0.16 0.10
incumbent γ = 3 0.85 0.44 0.43 0.49
θ = 3
2
0.14 0.18 0.12 0.22
challenger γ = 4 0.78 0.37 0.36 0.29 0.14
θ = 3
2
0.17 0.14
incumbent γ = 1 1 0.52 1
θ = 1 0.31 0.40
challenger γ = 9
5
0.94 0.45 0.56
θ = 1 0.56 0.27
incumbent γ = 1 1
θ = 1 0.56
challenger γ = 5 0.2
θ = 1 0.56
Incumbent market share: 0.55. Marginal cost c = 0. a In the column labelled HBPD, for each firm
the top price refers to p∗, while the bottom price refers to p∗ −m∗. b The column labelled UI refers
to the analysis of unilateral incentives, with the incumbent price discriminating and the challenger
charging a uniform price.
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Table 2: Example: Weibull Distribution
Firm Param. HBPD Profit MFCC Profit MFCC Profit
α = 0.4 α = 0.05
inc. γ = 3 0.33 0.33 0.33
θ = 1 0.12 0.131 0.20 0.130 0.31 0.167
chal. γ = 4 0.25 0.29 0.31
θ = 1 0.16 0.104 0.19 0.107 0.30 0.146
inc. γ = 3 0.43 0.66
θ = 3
2
0.14 0.18 0.51 0.272
chal. γ = 4 0.36 0.51
θ = 3
2
0.17 0.14 0.47 0.217
Incumbent market share: 0.55. Marginal cost c = 0.
Table 3: Example: Weibull Distribution
Firm Param. UP Profit HBPDaProfit PPDb Profit UIc Profit
incumbent γ = 3 0.85 0.44 0.43 0.53 0.73
θ = 3
2
0.14 0.18 0.48 0.09 0.66 0.38
challenger γ = 4 0.78 0.37 0.36 0.50 0.66 0.32
θ = 3
2
0.17 0.14 0.45 0.02
Incumbent market share: 0.55. Marginal cost c = 0. a In the column labelled HBPD, for each firm the top price refers to
p∗, while the bottom price refers to p∗ −m∗. b HBPD subject to the constraint that the discount is limited to 10 percent
of the regular price (β = 0.1). c The column labelled UI refers to the analysis of unilateral incentives, with the incumbent
price discriminating subject to the peg with β = 0.1, and the challenger charging a uniform price.
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Table 4: Probabilities of Lock-In
Regime incumbent challenger incumbent challenger
γ = 3 γ = 4 γ = 3 γ = 4
θ = 1 θ = 1 θ = 3
2
θ = 3
2
HBPD 0.60 0.59 0.67 0.66
UP 0.94 1 0.95 1
UI 0.70 0.67 0.76 0.75
MFCCa α = 0.4 0.38 0.37 0.93 0.88
0.95 1 0.95 1
MFCC α = 0.05 0.55 0.45
0.94 1
PPD 0.93 0.99
UI 0.95 1
Incumbent market share: 0.55. Marginal cost c = 0. Probabilities of lock-in calculated for the Weibull
examples in Tables 1-3. a In the rows for MFCCs, the top entries refer to the probabilities of internal
lock-in, and the bottom entry to the probability of customer retention.
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